“The Minister of Opportunity”: Mino on Mangabeira

CC this week: “Disneyland of Wiretapping. Outlaw it, no. Stop leaks, yes.” The siege of the President’s brother united government and opposition in criticism of federal police methods, but this should not be used to impede investigations. A Ministry of Justice proposal would widen the use of surveillance.” See also Behind the Music: The Estadão on the Leaky Police and Brazil: Globo and the Leaky Police. Again.

O ministro do Opportunity — CartaCapital: Mino Carta of the 75,000-copy newsweekly – actually, it recently rebranded itself as a “journal of opinion,” but it is still a lot newsier than some straight newsweeklies — CartaCapital gets his two tostões‘ worth in on the Minister of the Future, Harvard Law professor Roberto Mangabeira Unger.

The CC crew is not fond of Daniel Dantas, for whom Mangabeira serves as a proxy, because Dantas allegedly had CC journalists illegally wiretapped — the criminal case is in its preliminary phases.

See Dantas and Kroll: Early Daze for as much background as I could google up.

So bear that in mind.

Enquanto prossegue a novela sobre a posse do professor de Harvard Roberto Mangabeira Unger na futura Secretaria Especial de Planejamento Estratégico, antes chamada de Longo Prazo (Sealopra), CartaCapital acrescenta um novo detalhe à discussão a respeito de quem são seus verdadeiros patrões.

While the soap opera over Unger’s appointment as Special Secretary of Strategic Planning — previously known as Long-Tem, or Sealopra — CC adds a new detail to the debate over who his real bosses are.

Mino misses a detail here.

The title of the post was changed from “Long-Term Activities” to “Strategic Planning.”

Planning actions is not acting.

As Lou Reed reminds us,

Between thought and expression
Lies a lifetime

Mino:

O professor, sabe-se, representa a Brasil Telecom em ações nos Estados Unidos. É um trustee. São pendências judiciais que interessam ao banqueiro Daniel Dantas e atingem os interesses dos reais donos da operadora, fundos de pensão, Telecom Italia e Citibank. Pergunta-se: por que os sócios da BrT, prejudicados pelas ações em curso, não rompem unilateralmente com Mangabeira Unger? Resposta: por conta da cláusula 9.1 do acordo. Segundo a cláusula, apenas o CVC/Opportunity Equity Partners Administradora de Recursos Ltda., sediado no Brasil, no Rio de Janeiro mais especificamente, tem o poder, salvo o próprio professor, de substituí-lo.

The professor, as you know, represents Brasil Telecom in lawsuits filed in U.S. courts. He is a trustee. These are legal proceedings that interest Daniel Dantas and affect the interests of the owners of the telcoms operator: pension funds, Telecom Italia and Citibank. So ask yourself: Why do the partners in BrT, whose interests are harmed by the pending lawsuits, not unilaterally break with Mangabeira Unger? Answer: Because of Clause 9.1 of the contract. According to this provision, only CVC/Opportunity Equity Partners [Asset Managers] Ltda., domiciled in Brazil, and more specifically in Rio de Janeiro, has the power, apart from the professor himself, to replace him.

The zombie manager cannot be fired. Somebody’s lawyer obviously should be, though, signing a contract like that.

É mais uma prova do que CartaCapital tem demonstrado com freqüência: Dantas usava dinheiro dos demais sócios nas empresas de telefonia para defender seus próprios interesses ou bancar mordomias de seus asseclas. O Opportunity era o gestor das companhias e é acusado de não cumprir com seus deveres de administrador. O Citibank cobra-lhe 300 milhões de dólares na Justiça americana. Uma auditoria na BrT apurou desvios de 600 milhões de reais durante o período em que a empresa foi tocada pelo banqueiro.

This is one more piece of evidence for what CC has shown with some frequency: Dantas used the money of other partners in the telephony companies to defend his own interests or bankroll the fiefdoms of his vassals. Opportunity was a management firm and is accused of breaching its fiduciary duty. Citibank is suing it for $300 million in a U.S. court. A BrT audit found misappropriations of R$600 million during the time the company was controlled by the banker.

Um exemplo de como agiu Mangabeira Unger a favor de DD. A BrT movia uma ação contra a Telecom Italia e outra contra a Previ, fundo de pensão dos funcionários do Banco do Brasil, baseadas no mesmo argumento. Em 2005, Dantas chegou a um acordo financeiro com os italianos (mais tarde rompido). O trustee retirou então a ação contra a Telecom Italia, parte do acerto que deu, de imediato, 50 milhões de euros ao Opportunity. Mas manteve o processo contra a Previ.

Here’s an example of how Mangabeira Unger operated on DVD’s behalf. BrT filed a suit against Telecom Italian and another against the Previ pension fund, which is for Banco do Brasil employees, based on the same argument. In 2005, Dantas settled with the Italians (a deal he later broke). The trustee withdrew the lawsuit against TI as part of a settlement that gave Opportunity 50 million euros. But he maintained the suit against Previ.

Em resumo, é como se o síndico usasse a arrecadação do condomínio para fazer melhoras em sua própria casa ou entrasse na Justiça para tomar o apartamento de um proprietário legítimo. Mangabeira Unger, está provado, trabalha para o banqueiro, e não em favor dos interesses da BrT. No governo, há quem ele servirá?

In short, it’s as if your condo president used the condo fees to fund improvements on his own apartment or filed suit to take possession of an apartment from its legitimate owner. Mangabeira Unger, it is a proven fact, works for the banker and not on behalf of BrT. In the government, whose interests will he serve?

The factual question still to be resolved is whether Unger will withdraw the lawsuit and retire as Dantas-appointed BrT trustee.

He does not seem to want to. Dick Cheney wants to stay on as CEO of Halliburton.

Paulo Maluf, by the way, did not quit his corporate executive job when appointed to the governship of São Paulo by the president-general.

As governor, he then had an expressway built to his other job so he could get there easier.

Innovations in public administration indeed!

Blawgers, tell me: Would you sign an employment contract in which you were prohibited from dismissing the employee for cause, even if you caught them stealing?

So how did that happen?

Only in Brazil — and Massachussets, apparently, which has not been able to sell the rest of the country on a native-son presidential candidate whose name begins with the letter k for nearly 50 years now.

Not even going up against a walking political disaster like Bush.

And the blogging strategists behind that debacle still run the Democratic Party. Go figure. Somehow, rewarding failure has become a hallmark of Politics 2.0.

In the next election, I am voting for the candidate who refuses to blog.