Haiti É Aquí: “Joint Army-Police Maneuvers in Rio”

“MINUSTAH’s after action report stated that the firefight lasted over seven hours during which time their forces expended over 22,000 rounds of ammunition and received heavy fire in return.” A MINUSTAH “acknowledged that, given the flimsy construction of homes in Cite Soleil and the large quantity of ammunition expended, it is likely that rounds penetrated many buildings, striking unintended targets. As the operation was a raid, MINUSTAH did not remain in the area to do an assessment of civilian or gang member casualties…” (Compare Geneva Convention Out the Window in Rio Free-Fire Zones?)

Exército e PM do Rio treinam estratégia conjunta em favela: “Army and Rio de Janeiro military police train on strategy in shantytown.”

More reporting from the Estado de S. Paulo’s gung-ho embedded military affairs reporter, who has gone into the field (sort of) with the Brazilian military in Haiti, where it leads the MINUSTAH peacekeeping mission.

Her “blow by blow” report on MINUSTAH’s Cite Soleil incursion failed to live up to its billing, I thought. “Noon to 11pm: Running around shooting off ammo.” Some blow-by-blow.

The subhed: “Rio’s BOPE plays the role of the bandits.”

See also

• “The Jordanians Did It”: The Parallel Universes of Rio and Port Au Prince
• Rio: “Armed Forces Personnel May Be Training Drug Soldiers.”
• “Haiti É Aqui”: Embedded Reporter on the Army in Rio
• Haiti Não É Aqui: Cabral on Port au Prince and Rio
• “Haiti is a Laboratory For Rio”: Estadão
• “Haiti É Aqui”: The Brazilian Army Takes Sun City
• Will the Army Patrol the Streets of Rio de Janeiro?
• “The Army Will Not Patrol the Streets of Rio de Janeiro,” Part III

RIO – Recebidos a tiros pelos traficantes, 26 militares do Exército realizaram uma operação secreta em uma favela do Rio de Janeiro. Objetivo: libertar três pessoas mantidas em um cativeiro e prender Amaral Duclonas, 27 anos, criminoso hábil que aterroriza a população, com extorsões, assassinatos e seqüestros.

Met with gunfire from drug traffickers, 26 Army soldiers conduct a secret operation a Rio de Janeiro shantytown. Objective: free three persons held hostate and arrest Amaral Duclonas, 27, a crafty criminal who terrorizes the population through extortion, murder and kidnapping.

The catch: It’s fictional.

Duclonas claims he is not a criminal, but a Fanmi Lavalas militant.

The Estadão really seems to want the Army on the street. Even though the Army high command says emphatically that it does not.

“Also popular” links from the Estadão on this story (I translate):

• Shantytown population routinely gets military training (!)
• Haiti experience gives Brazil military know-how
• Follow the Army’s operation with the PM up the Rio hillside

A ação poderia ter ocorrido de verdade, mas não passou de um treino, realizado na quarta-feira, dia 15. Amaral é o último grande líder de gangue que ainda não foi preso pelos brasileiros no Haiti. Conseguiu escapar de várias operações realizadas pelas tropas internacionais das Nações Unidas e tornou-se o objeto de desejo dos oficiais do 8° contingente do Brasil que, com 1.200 homens, embarca em dezembro para o Haiti.

This action might have taken place in reality, but it was actually nothing more than a training exercise carried out on August 15. Amaral is the last big gangleader still uncaptured by Brazilians in Haiti. He has managed to escape from various raids by UN troops and become an object of desire for officers of the 8th Contingent, which, with 1,200 troops, is embarking for Haiti in December.

A sede do Batalhão de Operações Policiais Especiais (Bope), no Rio, tornou-se cenário para a base do Brasil em Cité Soleil, região da capital haitiana, Porto Príncipe, pacificada pelos brasileiros nos últimos oito meses e área de atuação de Amaral. O treinamento, de cerca de três horas, ocorreu na favela Tavares Bastos, na zona sul da capital fluminense. A favela é considerada pelo governo do Estado como a única onde o tráfico não domina e onde não há violência, devido à presença ostensiva da tropa de elite da Polícia Militar, que há sete anos tem um quartel no topo do morro.

The headquarters of BOPE, the special operations battalion, in Rio stood in for the Brazilian base in Cité Soleil, a region of Port au Prince that was pacified by the Brazilians over the last eight months, and is the area where Amaral operates. The training session, which lasted nearly three hours, took place in the Tavares Bastos shantytown in the Southern Zone of Rio. The shantytown is considered by the state government to be the only one where the traffic is not dominant and where there is not violence, due to the ostensive presence of the trooper elite, which for seven years has had its headquarters on the hilltop.

But remains a shantytown, mind you, rather than an area benefited by urbanization.

See also

• Rio: “Favela Lives in Peace Without Militias or The Traffic”

Os oficiais, provenientes do Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais e Espírito Santo, estavam pisando pela primeira vez na Tavares Bastos, desconhecendo os caminhos da favela e podendo facilmente ser alvo de emboscadas dos bandidos, representados pelos policiais do Bope, conhecidos pelo poder de atuação nos morros cariocas com o famoso “caveirão”.

The officers, who come from Rio, Minas Gerais and Espirito Santo, were setting foot there for the first time, were not familiar with the neighborhood streets, and were easy targets for ambushes by the bandits, who were played by members of BOPE, known for their power of action on the Rio hillsides and their famous “Big Skull” vehicle.

And for their extracurricular activities, in some cases:

• Rio: BOPE Busts a Striker

Tudo reproduziu nos mínimos detalhes as operações no Haiti. Antes de saírem para a missão, os militares fizeram uma reunião, onde o capitão Domingues, escolhido para o comando da operação do Exército brasileiro, entregou mapas e detalhou a estratégia de ataque. Quem faria o quê, quem iria por onde, quem faria o cerco e como se dividiriam nas estreitas vielas para evitarem o “fogo amigo”, termo utilizado quando se é alvo de tiros de homens que estão lutando do mesmo lado.

Haiti operations were reproduced in the most painstaking detail. Before going out to perform the mission, the soldiers held a meeting at which Capt. Domingues, chosen to command the Army operation, handed out maps and detailed the strategy for the attack. Who would do what, who would go where, who would be assigned to the siege and how the narrow alleyways would be divided up to avoid “friendly fire,” a term used when men fighting on the same side target one another.

Dois “caçadores” (snipers), atiradores do Exército que conseguem acertar um alvo a até 600 metros, foram estrategicamente posicionados no mais alto prédio no topo do morro: com uma visão ampla, eles são os primeiros a avistar os inimigos, podendo eliminá-los ou alertar os companheiros. Se a distância é maior, os caçadores vão buscar o alvo com a luneta e tentam acertar o inimigo o mais próximo possível. Um tiro a alguns palmos ou metros de distância consegue aterrorizar o oponente, que fica perdido, sem saber de onde vem o perigo.

Two “hunters” (snipers) from the Army who can hit a target at 600 meters were strategically positioned on the highest building on the hilltop: With a wide range of vision, they are the first to spot the enemy and can eliminate them or alert their comrades. At a greater distance, the snipers track the target with their scope and try to hit the nearest available enemy. A shot that strikes a hand’s breadth or a few meters from an enemy terrorizes him and he is lost, without knowning where the danger is coming from.

Segundo o tenente-coronel André Novaes, comandante do Centro de Instrução de Operações de Paz (CIOPaz) do Exército, o posicionamento dos atiradores é uma estratégia adotada em todas as operações e patrulhas no Haiti e já salvou a vida de muitos brasileiros na missão. Novaes comandou as tropas do Exército do terceiro contingente brasileiro, no segundo semestre de 2005, e quando voltou do Haiti teve a tarefa de chefiar a ação do Exército na Mangueira, quando militares subiram os morros do Rio, em maio de 2006, para recuperarem armas roubadas.

According to Lt. Col. André Novaes, commander of the Peacekeeping Operations Training Center of the Army, the positioning of the snipers is a strategy used on raids and patrols and has already saved the lives of many Brazilian soldiers. Novaes commanded the third Brazilian contingent in the second quarter of 2005, and upon returning from Haiti was assigned to head the Army action at Mangueira, in Rio, when the Army went up the hillsides in May 2006 to recover stolen weapons.

Alinhados, os soldados tomam suas posições e saem correndo “no lanço”: um faz a cobertura contra tiros e o outro avança de dois a quinze metros, tocando no ombro do companheiro da frente, para que ele avance também.

Lined up, the soldiers take their positions and take off running … one covering while the other advances from 2 to 15 meters, touching the shoulder of his comrade in front to indicate he should also advance.

Ouve-se um grito de um bandido, seguido de inúmeros estopins de tiros de festim. “Vai morrer!”. “Centauro para Dragão. De onde veio? De onde veio?”, pergunta pelo rádio, encurralado em um beco, o capitão Domingues, usando seu codinome.

A yell is heard from a bandit, followed by endless celebratory gunfire. “You are going to die!” “Centaur to Dragon? Where did it come from? Where did it come from?” Capt. Domingues, holed up in an alley, asks over the radio, using his code name.

“Aqui em cima, aqui em cima. Na laje, na laje”, responde alguém.

“Up here, up here! On the roof, on the roof,” someone replies.

“Atira! Atira!”, ordena Domingues.

“Fire! Fire!” Domingues orders.

O PM do Bope, que representa o criminoso procurado, esbeira-se entre as ruelas da Tavares Bastos, sobe em uma laje, salta entre a marquise de duas casas e consegue escapar dos militares. Corre alguns metros, mete-se em outras ruelas que não conhecia e vai parar lá na frente dos militares, rindo à toa por ter conseguido fugir. “Vi como é fácil ser bandido no Rio”, comemora o policial.

The BOPE trooper playing the wanted criminal creeps along the narrow streets of Tavares Bastos, climbs up on a roof, jumps from one house to another, and manages to get away. He runs a few meters, enters another series of streets he is not familiar with and winds up running into the soldiers, laughing because he managed to get away. “I saw how easy it was to be a bandit in Rio,” the policeman gloats.

Em meio à confusão e à gritaria, o comandante Domingues avista a casa que, conforme o mapa que tem em mãos, é o reduto de Amaral. Os oficiais cercam o local e engatilham os fuzis.”É esta porta de ferro, a de ferro. Arromba, arromba. Estoura logo!”, ordena Domingues.

In the middle of the shouting and confusion, Domingues, the commander, spots the house where, according to the map, Amaral has his stronghold. The officers surround the location and ready their weapons. “It’s that iron door, that iron door. Smash it in, Smash it in. Bust it now!” Domingues orders.

Um militar empurra a porta e avança. “Entra, entra”, grita Domingues. “Faz segurança aqui. Cobre ele ali”, acrescenta.

A soldier pulls the door open and advances. “Enter, enter,” Domingues shouts. “Do security here. Cover him there,” he adds.

Domingues says everything twice, two times. Redundancy reduces ambiguity. I remember reading that in Semantics 101.

Os soldados avançam por uma construção inacabada de três andares, com lajes irregulares. A mira do fuzil acompanha o olhar. A casa é revistada e Amaral, pelo menos na ficção, preso.

The soldiers advance through an unfinished building of three stories with irregular roofs. The sight of the assault rifle tracks their gaze. The house is searched and Amaral, at least fictionally, is arrested.

I thought we learned above that he easily escaped?

“Mão na cabeça ou leva tiro na testa”, grita um oficial para Amaral. O criminoso porta uma arma e, segundo as regras de engajamento da ONU, os militares podem atirar quando há risco para sua segurança ou a de civis.

“Hands on your head or you get shot in the forehead,” an officer yells.

In Creole French, I hope.

A shortage of language-proficient personnel has been cited as a shortcoming of the MINUSTAH mission, I have read.

The criminal is carrying a weapon and, under UN rules of engagement, the soldiers can fire when there is a risk to their own safety or that of civilians.

Imagine if they could not.

A avaliação do treino: “Matamos muitos, mas também perdemos gente. Demos muito tiro, vamos ter que avaliar isso. Pelo menos pegamos o Amaral”, diz Domingues, com o suor escorrendo pelo rosto e o carômetro no bolso, uma espécie de fichário com foto dos bandidos procurados.

Evaluation of the training mission: “We killed a lot, but we also lost people. We fired a lot of rounds, we need to evaluate that. But at least we got Amaral,” said Domingues, sweat pouring over his face and his facebook, with photos of wanted bandits, in his pocket.

Did I or did I not read that the PM playing the “wanted criminal” easily escaped?

“Por isso é que sou voluntário para ir ao Haiti. Passamos anos aprendendo sem poder agir. Participar da missão é uma grande experiência profissional e oportunidade ímpar de colocarmos em prática o que a gente passa a vida inteira só treinando”, acrescenta o capitão.

“This is why I volunteered to go to Haiti. We spend years training and never get to use it. Going on a mission is a great professional experience and a peerless opportunity to put into practice what we spend our whole lives training to do,” the Captain adds.

Como a ação não utilizou DSET, simuladores que apontam mortos e feridos nos confrontos, o coronel Novaes não conseguiu precisar o número de vítimas.

Because the action did not use DSET gear — simulators that indicate deaths and injuries — Col. Novaes could not state with precision the number of victims.

“Para um teste, foi bom. Eles começaram o treinamento há poucos dias, tem mais quatro meses de preparação pela frente. Com o tempo, eles se conhecerão e apenas com um olhar já sabem o que tem de fazer. Todos os militares que vão para o Haiti são experientes. O que a gente faz é aprofundar o conhecimento e dar técnicas especiais para o combate urbano desenvolvidas nestes três anos de experiência. A gente sabe como fazer e tem dado certo. Graças ao treinamento até hoje não perdemos nenhum soldado em combate”, afirma Novaes.

“For a test, it went well. They just started their training a few days ago, we have another four months to train for the front. With time, they will get to know one another and with just a glance will already know what to do. All the soldiers going to Haiti are experienced. What we do is deepen their knowledge and impart special techniques for urban combat developed over the three years of this mission. We know how to do it and it is working. Thanks to our training, to date we have not lost a single soldier in combat,” Novaes says.

There have been 20 fatalities in all among MINUSTAH personnel (the UN does not break them down into combat and noncombat).

Scoop (New Zealand), August 16, 2007 — a reprint of a COHA analysis — while citing modest improvements in the situation in Haiti, appears to endorse criticisms of the MINUSTAH mission that use such terms as “inept” and “scrambled”:

MINUSTAH has suffered from major logistical setbacks and has been the target of vociferous criticism of its inept strategy and scrambled administrative management, both domestically and internationally. This includes accusations that the mission essentially failed to prevent the Haitian National Police (HNP) forces from perpetrating atrocities against unarmed civilians in Port-au-Prince and elsewhere in the country. A variety of non-governmental organizations and human rights advocacy groups (including Amnesty International) allege that the UN has neglected crucial humanitarian work in Haiti and has instead chosen to allocate its relatively scant resources towards policing unstable urban areas and curbing the violence authored by exceedingly well-armed shantytown gangs. This allocation was originally at the behest of the U.S.-installed and universally discredited Latortue government, under a de facto and biased anti-Aristide directorate composed of the U.S., France, Canada, the OAS and the UN.

And “botched” and “largely ineffective.”

Its critics also contend that the UN forces’ operative style was to focus on controlling rival gangs, including a botched MINUSTAH operation that occurred in Cité Soleil in December 2006 and left up to 20 civilians dead. This has considerably weakened public confidence in the UN efforts within Haiti. Attempts to pacify rival gangs in Port-au-Prince by implementing Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) programs have also proven largely ineffective.

Brazil “has suffered a major loss of prestige,” but “can claim far more success” than a previous effort.

Perhaps more than any other nation, Brazil has suffered a major loss of prestige in its effort to stabilize Haiti. Nevertheless, the Brazil-commanded MINUSTAH forces and President Préval can claim far more success than the mooncalf pacification efforts undertaken by the U.S.-UN supported interim regime of Prime Minister Gerard Latortue, whose disgraceful lassitude and policy of mean-spirited vengeance have rung up a very negative balance of corruption and wasted opportunities.

I guess I should try my hand at translating that into Português.